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669 
ASSERTING STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
NATIONAL COMMUNITIES OF ISLAM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN: SHARIA 
COURTS AS A TOOL OF MUSLIM 
ACCOMMODATION AND INTEGRATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Britain has recently conferred legal validity to decisions made by 
courts that apply sharia law, the Islamic religious code, under the 1996 
Arbitration Act.
1
 According to Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, a legal 
advisor to the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, the Act allows for consenting 
Muslims to obtain judgments based on sharia law through arbitration, a 
form of alternative dispute resolution.
2
 Arbitration, as provided for by the 
Act, enables parties embroiled in a civil dispute to have their case heard by 
an impartial tribunal without the costs of litigation.
3
 Moreover, the Act 
gives the full force of law to decisions made in this manner for all parties 
who agree to arbitrate under its provisions.
4
 Thus, decisions made by 
sharia courts are binding, just as any other private arbitration is under 
British law. 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Dan Bell, The View From Inside a Sharia Court, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7238890.stm; Matthew Hickley, Islamic Sharia Courts in Britain 
Are Now Legally Binding, MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1055764/Islamic-sharia-courts-Britain-legally-binding.html; Richard Edwards, Sharia Courts 
Operating in Britain, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 
2957428/Sharia-law-courts-operating-in-Britain.html. 
 2. More specifically, according to Siddiqi, ―We realized that under the Arbitration Act we can 
make rulings which can be enforced by county and high courts. The act allows disputes to be resolved 
using alternatives like tribunals. This method is called alternative dispute resolution, which for 
Muslims is what the sharia courts are.‖ Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, THE 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article4749183.ece. 
 3. As pertinent here, the Arbitration Act provides:  
1. The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be construed 
accordingly— 
(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense;  
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such 
safeguards as are necessary in the public interest;  
(c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this 
[Act]. 
Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23, § 1 (Eng.). 
 4. See generally MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2012) (describing the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal‘s use of the Arbitration Act to 
render enforceable judgments based on sharia law). 
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This practice has been the subject of controversy in Britain and 
throughout the West,
5
 as critics question whether applying sharia law in 
formal legal settings fundamentally compromises core democratic values.
6
 
As such, when several prominent Britons publicly supported the courts, 
they drove the British media into a furor.
7
 Accordingly, one commentator 
characterized the resulting debate surrounding the practice as split between 
those who see the courts as a helpful way to grant an immigrant 
community legal equality and opponents who caution against the dangers 
that the anti-democratic tendencies of sharia law pose to Western society.
8
 
Similarly, in the United States, the fear of the invasion of sharia law 
into domestic courts has infiltrated the national political discourse. For 
example, voters in Oklahoma, where only .004% of the population is 
Muslim, recently approved a ballot measure supported by mainstream 
politicians banning the use of sharia law in state courts by an 
overwhelming majority.
9
 Indeed, some U.S. citizens have expressed 
further concern that ―the United States stands to become another England 
 
 
 5. In Ontario, Canada, sharia courts have been banned outright. See, e.g., Kerry Gillespie & Rob 
Ferguson, New Law to Ban Religious Tribunals, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 15, 2005, at A9. 
 6. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Privatizing Family Law in the Name of Religion, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 925 (2010). 
 7. When Chief Justice of Britain, Lord Chief Justice Nicholas Phillips, voiced his support for 
these courts, he was widely criticized in the British media. Phillips‘s exact words on the matter were:  
[T]here is no reason why Shari'a principles, or any other religious code, should not be the 
basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution [with the understanding] 
. . . that any sanctions for a failure to comply with the agreed terms of mediation would be 
drawn from the Laws of England and Wales. 
Maria Reiss, The Materialization of Legal Pluralism in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions 
Should Be Non-Binding, 26 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 739 (2009). Moreover, Rowan Williams, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, drew fire for commenting on the necessity of ―crafting a just and 
constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom.‖ Kim 
Murphy, Islamic Law Finds a Role in Britain, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2008), http://articles 
.latimes.com/2008/jun/20/world/fg-sharia20. 
 8. John Bowen describes the fault-lines of the debate as such:  
Do the tribunals provide a useful model for legally recognizing the equal standing of an 
immigrant community? Or do they threaten the integrity of law and democracy, and 
promise—as some argue—the unequal treatment of women in that community? 
John R. Bowen, Private Arrangements: Recognizing Sharia in England, BOSTON REVIEW (Mar./Apr. 
2009), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.2/bowen.php. 
 9. That ban was passed on November 3, 2010, and seventy percent of voters supported it. Andy 
Barr, Oklahoma Bans Sharia Law, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
1110/44630.html. Moreover, Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives and 2012 presidential candidate, lent vocal support to the ban. In particular, Gingrich 
observed: ―We should have a federal law that says under no circumstances in any jurisdiction in the 
United States will Sharia [law] be used in any court to apply to any judgment made about American 
law.‖ Id. 
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or France, a place where Muslims are balkanized and ultimately threaten 
to impose sharia.‖10 
Nevertheless, the United States has never explicitly barred religious 
law from consideration in either private arbitration or domestic law 
proceedings. In fact, observant Jews arbitrate cases in rabbinical courts, 
and Christian arbitrations have appeared before federal courts.
11
 Although 
Muslims have yet to seek out religious arbitrations on any significant 
scale, sharia law courts have emerged, rendering decisions enforced by 
domestic courts of the United States.
12
 Accordingly, a discussion of 
whether sharia courts constitute an effective policy that is consonant with 
democratic values could be useful to America‘s leaders. 
This Note enters that discourse by considering whether the United 
States should follow Britain‘s example by explicitly sanctioning sharia 
courts for private arbitrations. Moreover, it looks more broadly to the role, 
if any, that sharia law should have in domestic courts across the country. 
In doing so, it argues the United States should learn from Britain‘s 
example because, with proper procedural safeguards, parties could use 
sharia courts in limited circumstances as an effective tool in alternative 
dispute resolution. Perhaps more importantly, it further suggests that 
sharia courts could offer a useful mechanism for the United States to 
manage the challenges posed by transnational Islam. 
To that end, Part II explores substantive areas of sharia law, including 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Part III details the social, political 
and historical context for the rise of sharia courts in Britain. Part IV 
discusses the structure of the organizations that run sharia courts in 
Britain. Part V develops context for the application of ecclesiastical law in 
the United States. Accounting for the context developed in Part V, Part VI 
applies lessons learned from the British example to determine the form 
sharia courts should ultimately take in the United States if legislators were 
to embrace them. Finally, Part VII concludes by arguing that, with proper 
safeguards, sharia courts can be a mutually beneficial policy for both the 
United States and American Muslims.  
 
 
 10. Bowen, supra note 8.  
 11. See, e.g., Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1111–13 (D. Colo. 
1999) (analyzing Christian arbitration panel under FAA); Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 
A.2d 343, 359–64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying D.C. UAA to synagogue). 
 12. See, e.g., Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003) (ordering Islamic arbitration to 
determine the enforceability of a marriage contract).  
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II. SHARIA LAW 
To best understand the controversy related to sharia courts, it is first 
necessary to get a sense of some of the basic tenets of sharia law.
13
 
Divorce, child custody, and inheritance constitute three of the main and 
most controversial dispute areas handled by sharia courts in Britain.
14
 As 
such, a better understanding of these specific areas illustrates the conflicts 
between sharia law and democratic values pertinent to this Note.  
Sharia law is the religious code of Islam; however, it is far from a neat, 
unitary set of laws. Rather, sharia law is woven together from five 
different sources: ―the Quran, Sunna (―tradition‖), qiyas (―analogy‖), igma 
(―consensus among Muslim scholars‖), and ijtihad (―independent juristic 
reasoning‖).‖15 The Quran, or the written record of Allah‘s word, is the 
primary source of sharia law. Since the Quran ―offers primarily ethical 
guidelines, not codified legal instructions . . . . [T]he other sources are 
used to supplement what the Quran does not directly set forth.‖16 Men and 
women have different rights, remedies, and privileges under sharia law.
17
 
Sharia law also varies significantly according to the practices of the many 
different sects of Islam.
18
 Nevertheless, some basic generalizations can be 
made about the principles of sharia law applied in British mediations and 
 
 
 13. Most broadly, ―Shari‘a law is a collection of Islamic principles by which Muslim societies 
abide. In Arabic, sharia literally means ‗a way to a watering place,‘ and thus a path to be followed.‖ 
Reiss, supra note 7, at 742. Accordingly, more than any readily discernible set of laws, sharia 
constitutes a way of life.  
 More relevant to the controversial practices at issue in this Note, arbitration has a specific and 
unique history in Islam. To that end, according to American University of Beirut professors Ahmad S. 
Moussali and Mona Rafeeq, ―the language of the Qur'an encourages arbitration of private conflicts.‖ 
Mona Rafeeq, Rethinking Islamic Law Tribunals: Are They Compatible with Traditional American 
Notions of Justice?, 28 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 108, 113 (2010). In fact, prior to Muhammad‘s well-known 
activities as a prophet, his reputation was based on being ―an honest and wise arbiter among the non-
Muslim, Arab tribes.‖ Id. Indeed, this style of reputation followed even after he became a prophet, as 
―he usually settled conflicting viewpoints by asking the opposing parties to explain their 
interpretations of the Qur‘an, and then he either confirmed or denied the validity of their 
perspectives.‖ Id. Muhammad also served as an arbiter between Muslims and non-Muslim 
communities. Id. Thus, arbitration as a style of conflict resolution is firmly rooted in Muslim history 
and tradition. As such, arbitration is consonant with principles encoded in sharia and, therefore, 
constitutes an intersection between sharia and the law of western democracies.  
 14. Reiss, supra note 7, at 742.  
 15. 1d. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Amira Mashhour, Islamic Law and Gender Equality—Could There be a Common 
Ground?: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia 
and Egypt, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 562, 575 (2005) (describing the differences between divorce rules for 
women between different sects in Islam).  
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arbitrations. The most prominent differences in the treatment of men and 
women occur in the family arena, including how husbands and wives may 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance.  
A. Divorce 
1. Men’s Procedures for Divorce 
While divorce is generally discouraged in Islam, several procedures 
exist for divorce under sharia law. Under those procedures, as in most 
other aspects of sharia law, husbands‘ rights differ from wives‘ rights. 
Specifically, men may divorce through a process called ―talaq,‖ which is 
traditionally enacted when a husband announces his wish to divorce his 
wife during her period of menstruation, while remaining sexually abstinent 
for a period of a month.
19
 The husband repeats this procedure three times 
before a marriage is officially dissolved under Islamic law.
20
 Alternatively, 
though eschewed by most forms of mainstream Islam, some men may 
divorce their wives by simply pronouncing, ―I divorce you‖ three times 
consecutively.
21
 
2. Women’s Procedures for Divorce 
There are four ways that Muslim women can divorce their husbands 
under sharia law. First, they may employ ―delegated talaq,‖ a procedure 
which wives and husbands must secure by contract prior to marriage that 
allows both men and women to divorce unilaterally.
22
 Second, a wife may 
exercise a ―khul,‖ wherein ―she must give something for her freedom—
usually her dowry. After a wife requests a khul, the husband is not 
permitted to reconcile without her consent.‖23 Third, a wife may also 
obtain a divorce through judicial intervention, e.g., for ―maltreatment and 
harm . . . refusal or inability to maintain the marriage, desertion or absence 
for more than one year, and physical or mental defect that would make a 
continuation of the marriage harmful to the wife.‖24 Fourth, a wife is 
 
 
 19. Id. at 748. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 749.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Reiss, supra note 7, at 750.  
  24. Mashour, supra note 18, at 575.  
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vested with the right to divorce if her husband has in some way breached 
agreed-upon terms of the marital contract.
25
 
B. Child Custody 
Under sharia law, a father retains the ultimate right to custody over his 
children. To that end, up until a designated age, children remain with their 
mother, at which point they are transferred to the father. That structure 
exists because, under sharia law, the father is ―the ‗natural guardian‘ of his 
children with the paternal grandfather as second-in-line to guardianship.‖26 
Accordingly, legal guardianship is passed down ―along the father‘s 
bloodline where neither the father nor the paternal grandfather is able to 
take custody of the child.‖27 However, while ultimate legal guardianship is 
reserved for the father, immediate physical custody is often granted to the 
mother following a divorce.
28
 The mother typically retains physical 
custody of the child ―until the child reaches the age of custodial 
transfer.‖29 Inevitably, therefore, a transfer of custody must take place 
under these principles. And, consistent with many of the gender disparities 
under sharia law, the predetermined age for transferring the custody of 
boys and girls differs: for boys, the transfer usually occurs in the range of 
from 7 to 9 years-old; for girls, that range is less definite, as it can ―extend 
anywhere from puberty to womanhood.‖30 
C. Inheritance 
When an inheritance dispute arising under sharia involves a man and a 
woman, the basic governing principle is that a man receives twice the 
amount of a share of an inheritance as a woman within the same social 
class under a system of ―fixed shares.‖31 Of course, more specific 
guidelines apply to the circumstances of different familial configurations.
32
 
This law depends solely on gender, not the relation or role of the woman 
to the deceased individual whose will is in question. 
 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 753–54. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 754.  
 31. Id. at 756.  
 32. These inheritance rules likely predate the Quran, tracing back to ancient practices in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2012] SHARIA COURTS AS A TOOL 675 
 
 
 
 
III. CONTEXT FOR SHARIA COURTS IN BRITAIN 
A. Democratic Values in Britain 
Sharia courts have been controversial in Britain due to the obvious 
problems sharia law poses to women‘s equality and democratic values. 
Given the private nature of the arbitrations, the courts operate outside of 
the public view and free from meaningful independent oversight. This 
structure, though common in arbitrations, leads critics to worry that sharia 
courts will render unfair judgments enforced by intimidation on parties 
who have not truly consented to the court‘s jurisdiction. Along those lines, 
some feel the sharia courts have inadequate protections for women and 
children caught in abusive relationships.
33
 Critics also worry about the 
British government enforcing fatwas, or religious decrees.
34
 
Proponents of the courts make several arguments focused on religious 
liberty. To that end, parties involved in a dispute must consent to the 
jurisdiction of the sharia court, as the Act provides for parties to have 
disputes resolved in the tribunal of their choice.
35
 Parties also have broad 
discretion to set the terms of arbitration.
36
 Moreover, many women, 
despite being treated unequally under sharia law, seek out imams, Islamic 
spiritual leaders, for guidance on religious matters, as they care deeply 
about complying with sharia law.
37
 Given the transnational nature of many 
of the marriages in question, sharia courts often provide an important 
bridge between Britain and immigrants‘ home countries.38 Finally, by 
 
 
 33. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, supra note 6, at 926 (arguing that the danger of applying sharia 
law in British courts stems from fundamental inequalities in the law for women, who would not be 
able to escape abusive relationships, and under-protection of children, who would suffer from living in 
such an environment); see also Andy McSmith, The Big Question: How Do Britain’s Sharia Courts 
Work, and Are They a Good Thing?, THE INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2009), http://www.independent 
.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-question-how-do-britains-sharia-courts-work-and-are-they-a-good-
thing-1724486.html. 
 34. See McSmith, supra note 32.  
 35. Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23 § 15(1) (Eng.).  
 36. See Rafeeq, supra note 13, at 127.  
 37. See Bowen, supra note 8 (―Women tend to accept the tribunals‘ formal decisions because, 
strategically, religious divorces are important. But most then turn to the civil courts to obtain rulings 
on child custody and divorce settlements.‖).  
 38. John Bowen describes the need to bridge transnational marriages in the following manner: 
About one half of British South Asian Muslims have transnational marriages, and many find 
difficulties in English civil courts if their marriages lead to divorce. Pakistan does not accept 
all English grounds for divorce, and England sometimes refuses to acknowledge Pakistani 
divorces (in particular where the husband has pronounced a unilateral divorce, the talaq).  
Bowen, supra note 8. 
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some accounts, religious equality necessitates recognizing the legitimacy 
of the courts: the Jewish orthodox community has engaged in religious 
arbitration for over 100 years in Britain.
39
  
B. Historical and Social Context for Sharia Courts in Britain 
Britain has a long historical relationship with Islam through imperial 
conquests on the Indian subcontinent. Although a very small number of 
Muslim immigrants appeared in Britain as early as the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century, most Muslim immigrants came to fill the labor void 
following World War II.
40
 At the time, however, British officials had no 
reason to suspect that a majority of this influx would fail to repatriate and 
subsequently remain in Britain because most immigrants came with the 
intent of returning.
41
 Accordingly, Muslim immigrants ―thought of 
themselves as transient residents, and they regarded marriage and divorce 
as matters to be handled in the community overseas, with little or no 
involvement from the English courts.‖42 Britain thus had a liberal 
immigration policy that afforded all subjects in the British Empire the 
rights of ―entry and settlement‖ in Britain.43 After many of these once-
temporary Muslim laborers settled into the country, Britain placed limits 
on immigration.
44
 Nonetheless, the British government still allowed 
immigrant families to reunite.
45
 Yet, since many immigrants feared that 
the government might impose even more restrictive immigration policies 
in the future, most brought their families to Britain.
46
 As a result, the 
immigrant population of ethnic minorities in Britain ―expanded rapidly 
from the 1970s on, growing from an estimated 1 million in 1968 to 3 
million in 1991.‖47 Of these ethnic minorities, as of 2010, approximately 
2.87 million were Muslims residing in Scotland, England, and Wales.
48
 
 
 
 39. See Fretwell Wilson, supra note 6, at 927.  
 40. JOEL S. FETZER & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, MUSLIMS AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, 
AND GERMANY 27 (2005). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Bowen, supra note 8.  
 43. FETZER & SOPER, supra note 40, at 28 (quoting Christian Joppke, Why Liberal States Accept 
Unwanted Immigrants, 50(2) WORLD POLITICS 266–93, 288 (1998)).  
 44. Id. at 28–29. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Damian Thompson, Muslim Population Has Grown from 1.65 Million to 2.87 Million Since 
2001, Say Researchers. What Does This Mean for Liberal Britain?, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100069830/the-muslim-population-has-grown-from-
1-65-million-to-2-87-million-since-2001-say-researchers-what-does-this-mean-for-liberal-britain/. 
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Britain‘s Muslims come primarily from Southern Asia, specifically 
Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.
49
  
Accordingly, since the 1960s and 1970s, the British government has 
engaged in an active campaign to integrate Muslim immigrants into the 
broader national community, while allowing them to maintain aspects of 
their cultural identity. For example, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, ―the 
British government provided aid to local ethnic associations, which 
became the primary bases for effectuating Muslim demands about 
schooling, halal foods, and other religious practices. Muslims learned to 
resolve problems ‗in the community.‘‖50 Many of those local organizations 
were united under one broader national organization when the Muslim 
Council of Britain (―MCB‖) was established in 1997.51 The MCB has 
since become the most prominent voice of Muslims in Britain, serving as 
an intermediary between the Muslim population at large and the British 
government.
52
  
 
 
 49. FETZER & SOPER, supra note 40, at 29.  
 50. Bowen, supra note 8, at 2. 
 51. See generally Muslim Council of Britain—Its History, Structure and Workings, THE MUSLIM 
COUNCIL OF BRITAIN, http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/MCB_acheivments.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2012) (explaining the history behind and inner workings of the Muslim Council of Britain).  
 52. The Muslim Council of Britain is organized around six ―aims and objectives.‖ The 
organizational constitution enumerates them as such:  
(i) To promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK. 
(ii) To encourage and strengthen all existing efforts being made for the benefit of the Muslim 
community.  
(ii) To work for a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society. 
(iv) To establish a position for the Muslim community within British society that is fair and 
based on due rights. 
(v) To work for the eradication of disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by 
Muslims.  
(vi) To foster better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole.  
Aims and Objectives, THE MUSLIM COUNCIL OF BRITAIN, http://www.mcb.org.uk/aim.php (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2012).  
 In practice, the Council applies these guiding principles, in accordance with Islamic scripture, 
laws, and norms, to several areas of public advocacy. See Konrad Pedziwiatr, Creating New 
Discursive Arenas and Influencing Policies of the State: The Muslim Council of Britain, 54(2) SOC. 
COMPASS 267, 272 (2007). Most importantly, the Council surveys and then characterizes Muslims‘ 
political interests. See Research and Documentation: Projects, THE MUSLIM COUNCIL OF BRITAIN, 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details.php?heading_id=14&com_id=2 (last visited June 1, 2012). 
Through discourse with the British government, the MCB not only advances particular policy issues 
but also ensures that Muslims engage meaningfully in the political process. See Pedziwiatr, supra, at 
268. As a result, the British government has recognized the Council as the foremost representative of 
British Muslims. Furthermore, the Council also represents Muslim culture and viewpoints to the 
British media. See id. at 273. This strategy of public image management consists of presenting Islam in 
a way that seeks to mitigate popular currents of Islamophobia and present a unified Muslim voice on 
important public issues. See id. Often, the Council‘s messages focus around the theme of mainstream 
Islam‘s respect for and espousal of peace and justice. See id. According to Konrad Pedziwiatr, ―The 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The MCB‘s rise has been mutually beneficial for the British 
government and the organization itself. On the one hand, as issues 
affecting Muslims have become more important, the MCB has 
opportunistically brokered its political power for a heightened status with 
the British government.
53
 At the same time, the British government has 
 
 
MCB argues its position not with reference to the Sharia or Qur‘an, which would not appeal to the 
majority of non-Muslim readers, but usually with references to principles such as human rights, 
international law and the will of the international community.‖ Id. 
 Since there are roughly 250 Islamic institutions, which include ―mosques, education and 
charitable institutions, women and youth organizations and professional bodies,‖ id. at 271, affiliated 
with the MCB, the presentation of a unified Islamic voice, either in the media or politics, is extremely 
difficult. More specifically: 
The differences between conservative and progressive, the first and second generation 
activists, as well as between the Deobandis, Salafis, Brelwis and others, all come into play not 
only at times when the organization decides to respond to major international events such as 
the military interventions in Afghanistan or in Iraq but also when addressing national issues 
which include inter alia religious extremism, anti-Semitism or homophobia within the 
Muslim population.  
Melanie Phillips, After the Rushdie Affair, Islam in Britain Became Fused with an Agenda of Murder, 
THE OBSERVER (May 28, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/may/28/religion 
.islam. These differences have not proven impossible to overcome; however, they are an important 
aspect of the organizational mode of operation. Moreover, one-third to one-half of its member 
organizations belongs to reformist Islam, suggesting at least some internal coherence. See Sean 
McLoughlin, The State, ‘New’ Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a ‘Resource’ for Public Engagement 
in Britain, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR STATE 55, 55–69 (Jocelyne Cesari et al. eds., 
2005). In addition to these political and media responsibilities, the Council also raises money for 
Islamic charities, provides guidelines to help Muslims deal with the challenges of western life, and 
compiles research and statistics to aid scholars of Islam. Id. Thus, the responsibilities of the MCB, like 
the organization itself, are broad and all encompassing.  
 With that said, the MCB occupies a tenuous place in Britain‘s public sphere, divided between its 
mission to represent the interests of a minority population and its desire to maintain the favor of the 
British government. Some Muslims, for instance, have accused it of being of being a bourgeois 
organization that has acted as a kind of mouthpiece for the British government‘s official stance on 
Islamic affairs. See id. at 60. Conversely, the British government has accused it of compliance with 
condoning radicalism. See id. at 61. For example, the MCB‘s ―‗failure‘ to support the war in 
Afghanistan in late 2001 . . . resulted in the government publicly questioning the very ‗authority‘ it had 
taken a key role in ascribing.‖ Id. Thus, the MCB is constantly walking a fine line between remaining 
faithful to their constituency‘s interests and beliefs and maintaining their favorable relationship with 
the British government. See id. (explaining that ―all minority leaderships must strike a balance 
between strategies of accommodation and protest‖). 
 53. Sean McLoughlin noted the opportunistic nature of the MCB‘s rise to prominence, 
commenting:  
Perhaps fortuitously, the MCB‘s consolidation of a ‗new‘ professionalized, and media-
friendly, Muslim representative body coincided with the election of New Labour. As we have 
seen, the party has been committed to an important role for faith in the more general project 
of civic renewal. However, as the elections of 1992 and 1997 have shown, it was also no 
longer in a position to take the votes of Muslims for granted. In any case, having received a 
positive response to its initial enquires, the MCB soon found itself invited to regular meetings 
and receptions at the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, even representing 
the latter as a part of delegations to Muslim countries.  
McLoughlin, supra note 52, at 61.  
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taken advantage of the rise of the MCB to incorporate a cohesive Muslim 
voice in its process of policy formation.
54
  
Unsurprisingly, the MCB has helped to shape the discussion of Muslim 
arbitration in Britain through its support.
55
 Similar to many of the 
important issues facing Muslims in Britain, the MCB‘s support was 
critical to the British government‘s acceptance of sharia courts. 
Additionally, as will be discussed below, the organizations that run sharia 
courts have come to resemble the MCB and other state-instituted 
organizations for Muslim integration throughout Europe in that these 
organizations represent the efforts to reconcile British ideals with Muslim 
values. These compromises have been essential to successfully integrating 
Muslims into Western democracies.  
C.  Policies in the Greater Western European States 
There have been similarities among the policy responses of western 
European states to the difficulties posed by accommodating Muslim 
immigrants.
 56
 These solutions have had similar positive consequences for 
minority integration.
57
 Specifically, western European countries have 
developed ties with Muslim religious authorities in a broader attempt to 
nationalize Islamic religious communities through the creation of 
representative governmental organizations.
58
 Rather than being ―overrun 
by the unplanned or undesired mass settlement of Muslims,‖ western 
European states, as demonstrated by the trends of their assertive policies 
of integration, have assumed an active role in managing the discrepancies 
between the individual and group identities of Islamic citizens.
59
  
 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. On that point, Inayat Bunglawala, assistant secretary-general of the Muslim Council of 
Britain, said, ―The MCB supports these tribunals. If the Jewish courts are allowed to flourish, so must 
the sharia ones.‖ Taher, supra note 2.  
 56. ―Western Europe‖ here refers to the highly developed democracies in the western portion of 
Europe, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria.  
 57. See generally Jonathan Laurence, Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in 
Western Europe, in IMMIGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE (Craig A. Parsons & 
Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 2009) (arguing that, despite widespread pessimism about the challenges 
posed by Muslim immigrants, western European states have taken similar constructive steps toward 
integrating these populations). Emblematic of a growing line of scholarship in this area, Laurence 
argues, ―European nation-states have reasserted their sovereign prerogative to manage the 
transnational threats associated with their citizens‘ religious membership.‖ Id. at 252.  
 58. Id. at 254–55. 
 59. Id. at 252. 
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While no other European country has authorized sharia courts, and the 
British government has not co-opted the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal or 
the Islamic Sharia Council in the same way it did the MCB, sharia courts 
promise the same benefits of state-supported Islamic organizations 
throughout Europe. Specifically, by legitimizing organizations that apply 
sharia in arbitrations, which arose in a fashion similar to the MCB, Britain 
can ensure that a moderate form of sharia law is promoted throughout the 
country. At the same time, government officials can use sharia courts to 
build closer ties to leaders in the Muslim community. Such a policy, 
therefore, would accommodate Muslim spiritual needs, while asserting 
state sovereignty over a diverse, transnational religion. A closer look at the 
organizations that run the sharia courts provides insight into the nuances of 
this approach.  
IV. BRITISH COURTS THAT APPLY SHARIA LAW 
A. Muslim Arbitration Tribunal
60
 
Studies have speculated that up to eighty-five courts apply sharia law 
in Britain.
61
 Chief among those are the courts organized under the 
umbrella of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (―MAT‖), which render 
binding decisions under the 1996 Arbitration Act.
62
 According to MAT, 
the overarching objective of the organization is to decide cases ―in 
accordance with Qur‘anic Injunctions and Prophetic Practice as 
determined by the recognised Schools of Islamic Sacred Law . . . as fairly, 
quickly and efficiently as possible . . .‖63 Moreover, MAT recognizes that, 
in certain circumstances, ―members of the Tribunal have responsibility for 
ensuring this in the interests of the parties to the proceedings and in the 
 
 
 60. See THE MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 4. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
describes its mission and purpose as such:  
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (―MAT‖) was established in 2007 to provide a viable 
alternative for the Muslim community seeking to resolve disputes in accordance with Islamic 
Sacred Law and without having to resort to costly and time consuming litigation. The 
establishment of MAT is an important and significant step towards providing the Muslim 
community with a real opportunity to self determine disputes in accordance with Islamic 
Sacred Law. 
Id. 
 61. See Denis MacEoin and David G. Green, Sharia Law or One Law for All 69 (2009), 
available at http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ShariaLawOrOneLawForAll.pdf.  
 62. See Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23, § 46 (Eng.). 
 63. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R., 1(1), available at http://www.matribunal.com/procedure_rules.html 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012).  
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wider public interest.‖64 To request a hearing before a court in MAT, 
interested parties must submit a written request, which, among other 
requirements, must set forth the ―grounds‖ and ―reasons in support of 
those grounds‖ for a case.65 Parties must also include whether they have 
authorized representation, a document and witness list, as well as any 
previous decisions relevant to the matter at hand.
66
 Parties may withdraw 
either ―orally, at a hearing . . .‖ or ―at any time, by filing written notice 
with the Tribunal.‖67 Tribunals that hear the cases must consist, at a 
minimum, of a ―Scholar of Islamic Sacred Law‖ and a ―Solicitor or 
Barrister of England and Wales.‖68 In rendering a decision, the Tribunal 
―may consider but not be bound by any previous decision of the Tribunal,‖ 
while ―tak[ing] into account the Laws of England and Wales and the 
recognised Schools of Islamic Sacred Law.‖69 There is no system for 
appeals within MAT, but parties may seek judicial review from Britain‘s 
High Court.
70
 Accordingly, by incorporating representatives from both 
 
 
 64. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 2(1). 
 65. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 2(1)(e)-(d). 
 66. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 2(1)(c),(f).  
 67. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 4(1). For reference, the procedure for bringing a case before the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal follows as such: 
2(1). The request for hearing must be in writing and must - 
 (a) be addressed to the Tribunal; 
 (b) state the name and address of the applicant and respondent; 
 (c) state whether the applicant has authorised a representative to act for him in the case 
and, if so, give the representative's name and address; 
 (d) set out the grounds for the case; 
 (e) give reasons in support of those grounds; and 
 (f) so far as reasonably practicable, list any documents and the name and address of any 
witnesses which the applicant intends to rely upon as evidence in support of the case. 
(2) The request for hearing must if applicable be accompanied by a copy of any relevant 
decisions against which the applicant is aggrieved. 
(3) The request for hearing must be signed by the applicant or his representative, and dated. 
(4) If a request for hearing is signed by the applicant's representative, the representative must 
certify in the request for hearing that he has completed it in accordance with the applicant's 
instructions.  
MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 2. 
 68. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 10(1). 
 69. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 1.  
 70. MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 23. The MAT also provides the following internal safeguards for 
errors in procedures under the rules listed:  
 21 (1) Where, before the Tribunal has determined a case or application, there has been an 
error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a rule –  
 1. subject to these Rules, the error does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings, 
unless the Tribunal so orders; and 
 2. the Tribunal may make any order, or take any other step, that it considers appropriate 
to remedy the error. 
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British and Islamic law, adhering strictly to the requirements of the Act, 
and offering the opportunity for some judicial review, MAT adjudicates 
disputes in a way that legitimately harmonizes British and Islamic legal 
traditions. At the same time, the organization has relatively formal and 
detailed procedural guidelines for establishing jurisdiction. Thus, like the 
MCB, MAT offers the British government an opportunity, through an 
organization that serves as an intermediary, to pursue a cohesive national 
policy with respect to Muslim immigrants.  
B. Arbitration and the Islamic Sharia Council 
Contrary to the rulings handed down by MAT, decisions rendered by 
the Islamic-Sharia Council (―ISC‖)71 have no binding authority under the 
Arbitration Act.
72
 Rather, the ISC provides mediation services, which offer 
 
 
1. (2) In particular, any determination made in a case or application under these Rules shall be 
valid notwithstanding that the determination was not made or served, within the time period 
specified in these Rules. 
MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 21. If such an error is found through the internal appeals process, the following 
procedures are employed to correct such an error:  
Correction[s] of [Error] or Correction of orders and determinations 
22 (1) The Tribunal may at any time amend an order, notice of decision or determination to 
correct a clerical error or other accidental slip or omission. 
(2) Where an order, notice of decision or determination is amended under this rule, the 
Tribunal must serve an amended version on the party or parties on whom it served the 
original. 
MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 22. Thus, while the potential for error and subsequent injustice is 
acknowledged, the internal appeals process employed by MAT leaves a significant amount of 
discretion to the Tribunal, without clearly defining important rights.  
 71. The Islamic Sharia Council describes its mission as such:  
The Council considers itself to be a stabilising influence within the UK Muslim community. 
Outside of Muslim countries, Islamic institutions are essential for the survival of Muslim 
communities. Other establishments such as mosques, schools, universities and banks preserve 
the Muslim identity of a community and create a protective environment for young and old 
alike.  
 Historically, Muslim organisations have urged the legislative authorities in the UK, to 
factor the Islamic viewpoint into all aspects of the legislative process, not least in the field of 
family law: the response to this call has been surprising indeed. The answer has been clear 
and unequivocal: one country—one law. Given that what was traditionally known as, ‗the 
Christian perspective‘ in the UK has been essentially annexed from all legal and legislative 
processes, it almost seems inappropriate to expect that the perspective of yet another 
religion—Islam—be factored into the discussion.  
About Us, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=13&Itemid=28 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).  
 72. How the ISC Works: Validity of the Council’s Divorce Certificate, ISLAMIC SHARIA 
COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/how-it-works/how-the-isc-works-6.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2012).  
A divorce decision issued by the Council nullifies an Islamic marriage to which it applies 
only and has no bearing on the status of any coexistent civil contract (one which is recognised 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/4
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parties a non-binding view of sharia law on divorces and other civil 
disputes.
73
  
The ISC‘s procedural rules are less formal and equality-conscious than 
those in the courts organized by the MAT. More specifically, for divorces, 
the ISC offers application forms on its website for men and women.
74
 For 
men, the form must be accompanied by a document detailing the reasons 
the party in question is seeking a divorce.
75
 Women are subsequently 
notified by letter and given 30 days to respond. Men are then given a 
―talaq nama‖—a document that makes the Islamic divorce official—which 
they must sign in front of two witnesses.
76
 Finally, the ISC mails two 
copies of the divorce certificate: one with the dowry enclosed to the 
woman and a second to the man.
77
  
The procedure is different, and far more onerous, for women seeking a 
divorce. Like men, women must submit an application, along with a 
document detailing the reasons they are seeking divorce.
78
 The ISC then 
sends up to three letters to the man, which he can respond to in the allotted 
time.
79
 If the man fails to respond to these three requests, the proceedings 
move forward without him.
80
 If he responds, however, the ISC conducts a 
joint meeting between the parties.
81
 At that point, an ISC representative 
 
 
as legally binding under UK Law); for a civil divorce, applicants are advised to refer to 
the UK legal system for assistance in this area. 
Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. How the ISC Works: Men Seeking Divorce, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-
sharia.org/how-it-works/how-the-isc-works-2.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. John Bowen describes the process of the typical Council meetings as follows:  
 Mediations may begin in a home or mosque, at the request of the husband or wife or 
family members, or at the Council office. The religious scholar will hear the dispute and 
probably encourage the couple to resolve their differences. If the dispute leads to divorce, the 
mediator will suggest arrangements for child-care, the disposition of the bridal gift (mahr), 
and support for the wife and the children—all according to his interpretation of sharia. 
Sometimes the couple signs an agreement based on the scholar‘s recommendations. 
 Once a month a handful of the scholars affiliated with the Council meet in a room next to 
the large Regents Park Mosque in Central London. They review case files, and, when they 
have enough information, grant divorces. The assembled scholars come from Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Palestine. They also rely on colleagues from Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere 
to interview petitioners in their own languages. Among themselves, the scholars deliberate in 
English, Arabic, and sometimes Urdu, depending on who is sitting at the table. 
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interviews the man and the woman separately and prepares a report.
82
 
Following the report, the case is presented before a panel, which decides 
whether to issue an Islamic divorce.
83
  
In addition to the mediation sessions described above, the ISC also 
issues fatwas in response to emails and postings online.
84
 These fatwas 
offer Muslims across Britain guidance on their religious questions, 
covering a wide array of subjects and sometimes striking a disturbing 
tenor.
85
 The ISC offers fatwas on child custody and inheritance issues but 
 
 
 Each of these cases presents its own complicated history, but many involve transnational 
journeys and pleas by women to receive religious divorces from their absent or wayward 
husbands. 
Bowen, supra note 8. Thus, given the transnational nature of many of the marriages involved in these 
proceedings, private mediations adjudicated under sharia law offer a necessary service to newly 
arrived immigrant women. Without such services, these women would be left without a divorce that 
would have any meaning in their country of origin. See, e.g., Kristine Uhmal, Overview of Shari‘a and 
Prevalent Customs in Islamic Societies: Divorce and Child Custody, California State Bar, 2004 Winter 
Education Section Education Institute/ International Law/ Family Law Workshop on International 
Custody Abduction, Non-Hague, Islamic Countries (Jan. 2004), http://www.lawmoose.com/ 
Documents/UmHaniarticle.pdf, at 10 (explaining that countries that in most countries that follow 
sharia law, courts do not recognize foreign or secular divorces). Providing these services therefore 
allows immigrant women to start over and build a new life in a democratic country. They are, in effect, 
a mechanism of transition. Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine totally depriving a woman of this 
option, even if less desirable aspects of sharia law are applied in a democratic context.  
 82. See Family Inheritance, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/family-
inheritance (last visited June 1, 2012); Children, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-
sharia.org/children (last visited June 1, 2012). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Some of the fatwas on the website merely give routine instructions on how to pray and live in 
accordance with Muslim law; others, however, seemingly promote viewpoints inconsistent with 
democratic values. For example, in response to a woman‘s inquiries about dating a Christian, the ISC 
observed in its response noted that Islam had legitimacy over the women‘s rights movement because it 
has a much longer tradition of ―elevat[ing]‖ women as ―human being[s].‖ Fatwa, ISLAMIC SHARIA 
COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/general/want-to-leave-islam-and-marry-a-christian-2.html 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Thus, the rhetoric of the organizations adjudicating disputes under Islamic 
law is a difficulty faced by democracies that choose to recognize them. Moreover, the ISC often issues 
fatwas without reference to the Quran, or any other text, and which are hastily and unprofessionally 
written. See About Us, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, supra note 71. As such, an additional concern that 
governments must face is the professionalism of the organizations they choose to recognize. Id.  
 MAT, on the other hand, in its ―values and equalities,‖ sets forth an entirely different set of 
priorities more consonant with the type of message that most democracies would be comfortable 
supporting: 
 We understand that some people will be concerned about taking a case to MAT thinking 
it may be just a group of Imams sitting in a mosque. Will they be biased against women? Will 
they understand young people? Will they understand contemporary problems in modern 
Britain? The short answer is we will have young qualified people, male and female, sitting as 
members of the Arbitration Tribunal. They are not scholars or lawyers from abroad but from 
here. In order to promote harmony, we intend to provide female lawyers to sit as the legally 
qualified member as often as possible. There will be no race or sex discrimination in this 
organisation! 
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does not detail a process as it does with divorce.
86
  
Thus, unlike MAT, the ISC neither incorporates perspectives from 
British domestic law nor seeks to comply with any of its requirements. 
Moreover, the relatively informal procedures and lack of a right of appeal 
that are in place heavily favor men over women. Similarly, the fatwas 
issued by the ISC reflect the organization‘s misogynistic and informal 
tendencies.  
V. ISLAM AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW 
The relationship between Islam and America is conspicuously different 
than the dynamic in Britain, as the United States has fewer historical ties 
to the Muslim world and a relatively smaller Muslim population. To that 
end, as commentators have pointed out, difficulties have arisen in trying to 
quantify the number of Muslims in America ―because the U.S. Census 
Bureau does not collect information based on religion.‖87 As a result, there 
have been significant discrepancies between the various studies that have 
collected data. Some estimates have been lower than one might expect: in 
2007, the Pew Research Center only accounted for approximately 2.35 
million Muslims in the United States.
88
 However, ―religious and interfaith 
groups, and the mainstream news media, often cite a higher figure of 6 
million American Muslims.‖89 Similar to most western democracies, the 
number of Muslims in America appears to be increasing. 
Islamic groups are much more diverse, both in terms of their missions 
and memberships, and much less unified in the United States than in 
 
 
 We believe in the co-existence of both English law and personal religious laws. We 
believe that the law of the land in which we live is binding upon each citizen, and we are not 
attempting to impose Shariah upon anyone. Shariah does however have its place in this 
society where it is our personal and religious law. What a great achievement it will be if we 
can produce a result to the satisfaction of both English and Islamic law!  
Values and Equalities of MAT, MUSLIM ARB. TRIB., http://www.matribunal.com/values.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2012). As such, at least in the British case, a correlation exists between the formality 
of the organization, that is, the extent to which it is organized and the power it is granted to adjudicate 
disputes, and the professionalism of the organization. That professionalism translates into an 
organizational mission more in sync with democratic goals and values. This trade-off is a potential 
point of dispute between those who prefer mediation instead of a binding arbitration because a tradeoff 
is involved: on the one hand, binding arbitrations give the government more control over the 
organization, its message, and its direction; on the other hand, mediations offer a significant forum for 
Muslim viewpoints without giving them the binding force of law.  
 86. How the ISC Works: Women Seeking Divorce, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www 
.islamic-sharia.org/how-it-works/how-the-isc-works-2.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
 87. Rafeeq, supra note 13, at 112. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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Britain.
90
 A streamlined umbrella organization, such as the MCB in 
Britain, does not exist in the United States; the largest organization is the 
Islamic Society of North America (―ISNA‖).91 Within ISNA, the Fiqh 
Council issues fatwas to provide guidance on everyday life for American 
Muslims, but the organization does not adjudicate personal disputes.
92
 One 
reason for the limited scope of the organization may be that American 
Muslims neither view themselves as outsiders like many European 
Muslims, nor do they see any significant conflict between Islam and 
democratic values.
93
 At the same time, while most Americans view 
Muslims positively, there is still a significant percentage of Americans that 
distrust Islam.
94
 Thus, the need for immigrant accommodation and 
integration is substantially different in the United States than in Britain 
and Europe.  
Moreover, like in Britain, it is common in the United States to use 
alternative forms of dispute resolution to settle legal disputes.
95
 Indeed, 
―arbitration is the second most commonly used form of alternative dispute 
resolution, after mediation.‖96 The Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖) 
―defines the parameters of arbitration tribunals' operation in America, as 
well as the extent to which courts may intervene in arbitration.‖97 Parties 
contract for arbitration and may ―select one or more neutral, qualified 
arbitrators to hear the dispute and then agree to be bound by whatever 
decision is rendered.‖98 Under the FAA, courts may stay a proceeding for 
an issue referable to arbitration or compel arbitration; the unsuccessful 
party in a court-compelled arbitration may, however, appeal a court‘s 
decision in limited circumstances.
99
 Courts encourage arbitration because 
 
 
 90. Qamar-ul Huda, The Diversity of Muslims in the United States: Views as Americans, 159 THE 
U.S. INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REPORT 1 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.usip.org/files/ 
resources/sr159.pdf.  
 91. Id. at 6.  
 92. History of the Fiqh Council, THE FIQH COUNCIL, http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/node/6 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2012).  
 93. Huda, supra note 90 at 1.  
 94. See id.  
 95. Rafeeq, supra note 13, at 114. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Section 3 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖) sets the specific circumstances in 
which a court may stay a proceeding for an issue that is referable to arbitration. With its broad 
language, this provision demonstrates the favored nature of arbitration in U.S. courts. 9 U.S.C. § 3 
(2006). Likewise, § 4 of the FAA also demonstrates the favored status of enforcing agreements 
to arbitrate in U.S. courts because the statute lays out the exact procedure for presenting an 
arbitration agreement before a judge or jury. Id. § 4. That safeguard is important in this context 
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of its cost-effective nature and because oversight mechanisms exist under 
the FAA to ensure a just and equitable outcome. 
Though rare, some tribunals apply sharia and other religious law in 
America during private arbitrations.
100
 Generally, the tribunals that have 
heard such cases are not organized in any official way and are conducted 
in secret.
101
 Instead, much of the litigation in domestic religious courts 
involving religious tribunals has involved Christianity and Judaism.
102
 
There have been, at times, constitutional concerns raised by allowing 
judicial enforcement of the awards doled out by religious tribunals.
103
 
The Supreme Court has addressed some of the broader concerns of 
critics in the United States concerning the relationship between religion 
 
 
because it ensures that fair arbitration agreements will be enforced, while unfair ones will not. 
Id. Section 16 of the FAA allows for appeals from both § 3 and § 4. Id. § 16. 
 In order to vacate an award, a party would have to bring suit in federal court to challenge its 
validity. After vacating an award, a ―court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing‖ if the contracted 
timeline for arbitrating has run out. Id. § 10(a). There are limited grounds upon which an arbitration 
award can be overturned, all of which are listed in the FAA. See id. § 10(a)(1)-(4). 
 Specifically, § 10 of the FAA enumerates the circumstances under which a U.S. district court can 
issue an order vacating an arbitration award. Id. § 10. The first instance of this is ―where the award 
was produced by corruption, fraud, or undue means.‖ Id. § 10(a)(1). This general fraud-related 
provision is written in the passive voice, thus covering the corrupt conduct of any party. See id. § 10. 
The next provision focuses on the same concerns, but with specific attention to arbitrators. See id. 
§ 10(a)(2). Accordingly, this part of the statute provides latitude to invalidate an award ―where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.‖ Id.  
 The next grouping of provisions focuses on procedural defects. To that end, awards can be 
overturned when an arbitrator engages in ―misconduct in refusing to postpone a hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown,‖ ―refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,‖ or ―any 
other misbehavior‖ compromising the rights of the parties involved. Id. § 10(a)(3). These of procedural 
errors could include a refusal to consider important evidence or create a fair timeline for the 
proceedings. Along these same lines, courts can vacate awards ―where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them‖ such that a final award ―upon the subject matter submitted‖ 
was not rendered. Id. § 10(a)(4). An example of the grounds to vacate described in this portion of the 
provision would include a ruling that did not focus on the key issues in arbitration.  
 100. See Abdul Wahid Sheikh Osman, Islamic Arbitration Courts in America & Canada?, 
HIRAAN ONLINE (2005), http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2005/dec/Prof_Abdulwahid211205.htm.  
 101. Id. 
 102. In the United States, ―[b]oth federal and state courts enforce religious tribunal decisions 
under the Federal Arbitration Act or under state statutes modeled on the Uniform Arbitration Act.‖ 
Michael C. Grossman, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review and Due Process, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (2007); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000) (allowing parties discretion to 
determine the terms of their arbitrations under federal law); Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of 
Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. 
L. & RELIGION 379, 381–82 (2009). (detailing the enforcement of awards rendered by Jewish Beth 
Din courts and Islamic courts in the U.S.). But see Charles P. Trumbell, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A 
New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2006) (arguing that the 
First Amendment proscribes courts‘ abilities to enforce contracts with Islamic terms or law).  
 103. See Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din 
Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 653–54 (2004) (noting 
tension between Establishment Clause and enforcement of Jewish Beth Din awards).  
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and law. Specifically, the Court has commented at length on the ways in 
which the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment limits religious 
freedom. In doing so, the Court delineated the difference between the dual 
freedoms enshrined in the Clause: the freedom to believe, which is 
absolute, and the freedom to act, which is limited.
104
 
Moreover, the distinction between the freedom to act and the freedom 
to believe has circumscribed the application of sharia law in domestic 
courts. This limiting principle recently came into focus in a New Jersey 
state court when a judge refused to issue a final restraining order against a 
Muslim man, as requested by his wife for protection from assault and 
sexual assault, after he claimed that his view of marriage, due to his 
religion, permitted him to have nonconsensual sex with his wife.  
That ruling was swiftly overturned on appeal, however, in S.D. v. 
M.J.R.
105
 The appellate court, in its decision, criticized the trial court‘s 
abuse of discretion as such: ―We are also concerned that the judge‘s view 
of the facts of the matter may have been colored by his perception that, 
although defendant's sexual acts violated applicable criminal statutes, they 
were culturally acceptable and thus not actionable—a view that we have 
soundly rejected.‖106 Thus, ultimately, the limitations to the freedom to act 
in the Supreme Court‘s precedent and domestic law would prevent sharia 
law from complete incorporation into American case law. As such, the 
 
 
 104. The Court has elaborated on that distinction in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–
04 (1940), and Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1963), 
amongst other cases. In Cantwell, the Court explained:  
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On 
the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of 
any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious 
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On 
the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the 
Amendment embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society.  
310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). Moreover, in Smith, it further elaborated:  
The government‘s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ―cannot depend on 
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector‘s spiritual 
development.‖ To make an individual‘s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the 
law‘s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State‘s interest is 
―compelling‖—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ―to become a law unto himself‖—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 
494 U.S. 872, 885 (1963).  
 105. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. 2010) 
 106. Id. at 427.  
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proper procedural safeguards exist to allow sharia law in a limited, private 
context.  
VI. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRITISH LAW  
TO AMERICAN LAW 
If the United States were to implement the British system of sharia 
courts, it could build on the structure already in place by coordinating with 
ISNA and the Fiqh Council. Such an initiative, however, should take into 
account the benefits and drawbacks of MAT and the ISC.  
Drawing from MAT, the United States could create courts with more 
legitimacy by ensuring adequate procedural safeguards, protecting 
disputants‘ rights, and incorporating perspectives from domestic law.107 
The United States could build on the example set by MAT by ensuring 
greater transparency in sharia courts—perhaps by requiring sharia courts 
to keep detailed, formalized records of their opinions. Though uncommon 
for private arbitrations, this safeguard could account for the potential 
dangers that applying sharia in a democracy poses by ensuring the 
preservation of contentious issues for appellate review.  
Along those lines, while the FAA allows for some court oversight, such 
limited review might not protect against some of the anti-democratic 
aspects of sharia. To that end, the United States might consider combining 
 
 
 107. Even in MAT, which, as mentioned, is the most formally structured organization for sharia 
arbitrations, it is at best unclear how to access the records of any given proceeding. To that end, the 
Tribunal‘s rules governing the admission of the public to a proceeding are very broad, and operate 
under the assumption of privacy. The provision, found within MAT‘s procedural rules, is listed below:  
Admission of public to hearings 
17 (1) Subject to the following provisions of this rule, every hearing before the Tribunal must 
be held in private unless the parties agree to a public hearing. 
(2) The Tribunal may of its own motion exclude any or all members of the public from any 
hearing or part of a hearing if it is necessary—  
 (a) in the interests of public order or national security;  
 (b) to protect the private life of a party or the interests of a minor; or 
 (c) to achieve the overriding objective. 
(3) The Tribunal may also exclude any or all members of the public from any hearing or part 
of a hearing to ensure that publicity does not prejudice the interests of justice, but only if and 
to the extent that it is strictly necessary to do so. 
MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. R. 17, available at http://www.matribunal.com/procedure_rules.html. As such, not 
only do the parties in question have to agree to a public arbitration for any outsider to have access, but 
the Tribunal also reserves broad discretion to restrict access. This lack of transparency hampers the 
ability of the British government to create any meaningful oversight, which not only creates the 
appearance of injustice but also increases the likelihood of it. Also along those lines, more open 
arbitrations could lead to a better appeals process, which would be a necessary mechanism to rectify 
any potential injustices.  
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the formalized procedural safeguards of MAT with the non-binding, 
mediation format of the ISC. A rights-driven format would be necessary to 
avoid some of the extremism, inequality, and unprofessionalism that have 
crept into proceedings held and fatwas issued by the ISC. Furthermore, the 
non-binding nature of such decisions would protect disputants‘ ability to 
opt-out if treated unfairly.  
If, however, sharia arbitrations were sanctioned, stronger oversight 
would be needed so that sharia courts render decisions consistent with 
democratic norms. To that end, the United States would need to expand 
parties‘ explicit rights to appeal the final orders of the sharia court to civil 
courts so as to ensure that it does not infringe upon its citizens‘ rights and 
liberties. Moreover, by establishing stronger appellate review of sharia 
arbitrations, the United States could ensure that parties do not contract 
their rights away to unconscionable ends. The United States could also 
limit the application of sharia law in binding arbitrations to divorces, 
rendering the less democratic aspects of sharia law unenforceable.
108
  
A. Sharia Courts’ Potential As a Tool For Islamic Integration in America 
As discussed earlier, Britain has demonstrated the possibility of 
incorporating aspects of religious law into its legal system as a potential 
tool for the integration of Muslim immigrants. In this way, sharia courts 
may not only be useful for Muslim immigrants but also for the democratic 
countries in which they settle, as democracies have an interest in 
discouraging and regulating the presence of the anti-democratic aspects of 
some sects of Islam.
109
 As such, while the specific characteristics of the 
British legal and political system may lend itself to the particular form of 
sharia courts discussed in this Note, the British inclination toward 
compromising law and religion can still be useful in other contexts.  
Sharia courts in America might be thought of as an assertive attempt by 
a western democracy to nationalize its Islamic communities and exercise 
greater control over their integration. To be sure, as a country of 
 
 
 108. For example, the law of inheritance, which, as discussed supra Part II.B, automatically 
provides for a man to receive twice the amount of a female. Moreover, as also discussed supra Part 
II.C, child custody strongly favors men and does not account for the rights of the child. As such, 
binding arbitrations should exclude both these areas of law because each area would not only violate 
the guarantee of equal protection of the law under the U.S. Constitution but would also result in 
undesirable outcomes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 109. On this point, John Bowen, commenting on the English relationship with Islam, observed: 
―The English pathway may become a model for others not in its substance, which may fit only 
England, but in the reasonable fashion in which public figures attempt a compromise among 
competing political values.‖ Bowen, supra note 8.  
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immigrants, the United States is different than the more traditionally 
homogenous European states. Nonetheless, the United States is not 
immune to the challenges that transnational Islam poses to Europe 
because, like European countries, America is a democracy with similar 
goals and values. Moreover, like European countries, the United States has 
an interest in promoting mainstream versions of Islam to American 
Muslims to the exclusion of anti-democratic aspects of some sects of the 
religion. As such, America could benefit from following the British 
example of actively working to reconcile Islam with democracy.
110
 
Accordingly, the implementation of private sharia courts could have the 
positive effect of creating stronger ties between the government and the 
Muslim community, which, in turn, could curb radicalism and calm fears 
of non-immigrants.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Many western democracies have struggled with ways to integrate 
Muslim minorities while allowing them to preserve valued aspects of their 
culture. Allowing Muslims to maintain a sense of their cultural identity is 
essential to an effective integration strategy. At the same time, Islam is a 
diverse, decentralized religion, and it is difficult to characterize in a 
unitary way. This lack of hierarchical organization leaves room, through 
sharia courts, for states to promote moderate forms of the religion through 
their integration policies.  
Although no western country has gone as far as Britain has by 
recognizing the validity of sharia courts, it might be beneficial for the 
United States to take a more formalized approach to recognizing sharia 
courts in some limited contexts. Yet, whatever form the sharia courts 
might ultimately take, the United States would need to put in place rights-
 
 
 110. Yet the larger concern still remains as to whether Islam and democracy are even 
fundamentally compatible. Other studies examine the nature of Islam in relation to this question. 
Within this approach, some scholars contend that the diverse, de-centralized, structure of Islam results 
in the near impossibility of creating representative bodies within the governmental structures of 
church-state relations. See, e.g., Anthony J. Gill & Stephen Pfaff, Will a Million Muslims March: 
Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 803 (2006). 
In addition, secular critics of Islam contend that the religious values of Islam are antithetical to 
democracy. See Ayaan Hirsi-Ali, Muslim Women are the Key to Change, SUNDAY TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2006), http://www.aei.org/article/25067. Conversely, Jytte Klausen‘s research suggests that a majority 
of Muslim leaders favor integration into the West. JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE ISLAMIC CHALLENGE: 
POLITICS AND RELIGION IN WESTERN EUROPE 87 (2005). In fact, she found that most believe Islam is 
compatible with western values. See id. at 87. Subsequently, she argues that, although the rise of the 
Muslim minority represents challenges in many ways, it is not above the scope of normal political 
solutions. Id. at 211.  
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driven safeguards, which include: (1) adequate procedures governing 
fairness, transparency, and consent; (2) expanding the mechanisms 
available for appellate review of arbitrations or limiting sharia courts to 
non-binding mediations; and (3) providing strong regulatory oversight of 
the courts‘ professional quality.  
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